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# Gorbachev's New Foreign Policy Apparatus

An Intelligence Assessment

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# Gorbachev's New Foreign Policy Apparatus

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by \_\_\_\_\_ of the  
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**Gorbachev's New  
Foreign Policy Apparatus**

**Key Judgments**  
*Information available  
as of 24 June 1987  
was used in this report.*

During his first two years in office, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has carried out the most far-reaching shakeup of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus of any succession period. He has enhanced his personal control over foreign policy decisionmaking, opened up a broad range of options for achieving Soviet objectives abroad, and made Soviet foreign policy better serve his domestic priorities.

Gorbachev has moved aggressively to revamp Soviet foreign policy making because he inherited a rusty, ineffective bureaucracy that was ill suited to the conditions of the 1980s. Andrey Gromyko, after running the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for almost 30 years, was too intimately involved and committed to past policies to discard them when they no longer worked. The party apparatus was stultified and focused almost exclusively on advancing Communism abroad, paying little attention to other aspects of international relations. The leadership lacked a strategic center of foreign policy planning and focused its activities on uncritically perpetuating policies already in place, many of which were taking the Soviet Union down a dead end.

After removing Gromyko from the Foreign Ministry in July 1985, Gorbachev moved systematically to overhaul all key foreign policy making bodies. He turned over virtually the entire top leadership of the ministry and reorganized it to deal more effectively with arms control, relations with the United States, and other high-priority issues. Gorbachev's impact on the party apparatus was even more dramatic; he expanded its staff and refocused its work on East-West issues and the overall strategic planning of foreign policy. These changes shifted the center of gravity of Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking from the Foreign Ministry to the party Secretariat and put foreign policy matters more directly under the personal control of the General Secretary.

Gorbachev's moves to reorganize foreign policy decisionmaking have increased competition among the institutions involved. This has freed the leadership from its dependence on the recommendations of any single institution and has given it an expanded set of policy options. Gorbachev has made himself the final arbiter of these differences, enhancing his power over the decisionmaking process.

Not only have these changes provided Gorbachev with new perspectives and options, but they have also given him the ability to better evaluate and challenge the recommendations he receives. This has been most apparent in the area of arms control, where new staffs have been created in both the Foreign Ministry and the party's International Department. As a result, while the Soviet military continues to be a key player on questions affecting Soviet national security, its recommendations are open to greater challenge.

More than in any other policy area, these changes have improved the advice the party leadership is receiving in dealing with the United States. In addition to beefing up his arms control staffing, Gorbachev has shaken up the party and Foreign Ministry offices responsible for dealing with the West and has elevated a number of "Americanists" to key positions. Most notable among these are Aleksandr Yakovlev and Anatoliy Dobrynin—the former Ambassadors to Ottawa and Washington—who were promoted to the party Secretariat.

The net result of these efforts has been a new Soviet flexibility in dealing with a broad range of foreign policy problems. Although Soviet long-term objectives in the world have not changed, Gorbachev has tried a variety of new tactics to achieve them. This has produced new movement in some of the areas most critical to Soviet security, such as arms control and relations with China. The changes he has made in the apparatus in other sectors suggest that new initiatives toward other areas of the world may be coming.

Gorbachev's moves have also promoted a more intimate connection between Soviet domestic and foreign policy. For the first time in many years, the party Secretariat has prime responsibility for the strategic planning of both foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy initiatives have been derived more directly from the General Secretary's domestic goals of economic revitalization than was the case under Brezhnev, when expanding Soviet influence abroad appeared to be a top-priority objective without much consideration of the domestic costs. Soviet propaganda officials have also used Gorbachev's domestic reforms to improve the image of the Soviet Union abroad, helping ensure that Soviet positions get a more favorable hearing.

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While Gorbachev appears to have wide latitude to pursue new foreign policy initiatives, his efforts are not without risk. There appears to be some skepticism within both the political leadership and the military concerning his initiatives. By getting out front of his Politburo colleagues on foreign policy matters, the success or failure of these policies has become more the General Secretary's personal responsibility than were the more collective policies of Brezhnev. A major foreign policy success, although not needed to sustain his political position at home, would clearly help Gorbachev. On the other hand, if foreign policy successes continue to elude him or if the Soviet Union suffers a major setback abroad, those opposing him for domestic political reasons would be given new ammunition.

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# Gorbachev's New Foreign Policy Apparatus

## Scope Note

Since Mikhail Gorbachev became party leader two years ago, there have been major changes in the structure and staffing of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus. This paper takes a comprehensive look at these changes and focuses on the key institutions that now make Soviet foreign policy. Although the structural and personnel changes reviewed in the paper have had a profound impact on Soviet foreign policy in a number of areas, this paper is intended to give readers an understanding of how policies are made and does not focus on the specific policies themselves. This paper complements [

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### Gorbachev's New Foreign Policy Apparatus

Since becoming party leader in March 1985, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has moved aggressively to reorganize foreign policy decisionmaking. Not only has he swept aside the key architects of Soviet foreign policy over the past three decades, but he has also fundamentally altered the relationships among the key institutions that make Soviet foreign policy:

- On the eve of the congress, First Deputy Head of the International Department Zagladin directly linked domestic economic strength to Moscow's success in managing relations with the United States. He claimed that one of the reasons for the failure of detente in the late 1970s was that domestic economic difficulties created an impression of Soviet weakness in the West.

#### Gorbachev's Objectives

Gorbachev's foremost objective in shaking up Soviet foreign policy making is to make Soviet policies abroad better serve his domestic agenda. He has made the revitalization of the economy his highest priority, and he appears to be trying to create an international environment that will allow him to better accomplish that objective. At the same time, Gorbachev's domestic policies have also better served Soviet interests abroad, and there can be little doubt that under his leadership there is a more intimate connection between Soviet foreign and domestic policy than at any other time in the nuclear age:

- At the 27th Party Congress Gorbachev emphasized this close linkage, focusing attention on arms control as central to his plans for economic modernization and asserting that the USSR's "main international duty" is the creation of "viable socialism at home."
- The foreign policy provisions of the new party program adopted by the congress highlighted the regime's priority commitment to domestic revitalization. In contrast with the 1961 program it replaced, the new program scaled down expectations on the international scene and reversed the order of the domestic and foreign policy sections, with domestic policy now coming first. It asserted that the main goal of the USSR in the international sphere is to "ensure favorable conditions for domestic development."

Gorbachev's objective of domestic revitalization requires keeping a lid on the growth of Soviet defense spending to help provide resources for modernizing the civilian economy. To this end, he has turned to Soviet diplomacy to play a larger role in advancing Soviet interests abroad. In February 1986 he told the 27th Congress that Soviet objectives abroad could be better achieved by diplomatic than by military means, saying that, with today's weapons, ensuring national security is increasingly becoming a political task rather than a military one. On subsequent occasions Gorbachev has stressed that Soviet security cannot be guaranteed by military-technical means alone.

A second key objective for Gorbachev in wresting control of foreign policy decisionmaking from the holdovers of the Brezhnev era was to make foreign policy decisionmaking and implementation more effective. In the past, rigid Soviet policies that did not respond to changing world conditions and that were often carried out ineptly worked to undermine the Soviet position abroad. Gorbachev's reorganization has been designed to provide policymakers options, and to give a new face to Soviet diplomacy.

Finally, Gorbachev's reorganization of the foreign policy apparatus appears to be intended to give him greater personal control of foreign policy decisionmaking. Only by forcefully intervening in the decision-making process has Gorbachev been able to move Soviet policy dramatically on a number of fronts and

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overcome bureaucratic and parochial interests that bogged down major foreign policy initiatives under his predecessors. Gorbachev clearly hopes that the success of some of his foreign policy initiatives will redound to his credit and enhance his power at home.

To achieve his objectives for Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev has made clear that he expects his shakeup of the foreign policy apparatus to produce "new thinking" on nagging problems. He has encouraged a more pragmatic approach that does not allow ideological concerns to stand in the way of overall objectives, revamping ideological premises to serve new purposes:

- In his disarmament proposal of 15 January 1986, Gorbachev repudiated the approach of his predecessors, calling for a "break with the past" and an end to "the negative confrontational tendencies" that have developed in East-West relations.
- At the 27th Party Congress Gorbachev argued that "continuity in foreign policy has nothing in common with the simple repetition of what has been done before, especially in the approaches to problems that have been mounting up." Instead, he called for "tactical flexibility and a readiness for mutually acceptable compromise."

As the main elements of his "new thinking" have unfolded, Gorbachev has increasingly distanced himself from the policies of the Brezhnev era. For example, he has put new stress on the idea of the impossibility of victory in an East-West strategic conflict.

In addition to promoting "new thinking," to achieve his overarching objectives Gorbachev has carried out a multifaceted assault on the apparatus and the policies he inherited. He has:

- Conducted a broad housecleaning of the stultified foreign policy apparatus and brought in a new team more in agreement with his approach and better able to carry it out.

- Created competing centers of foreign policy advice, reducing the influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the military in decisionmaking, while enhancing the role of the party Secretariat.

- Set new standards of performance for officials and launched a campaign to eliminate corruption and nepotism from the apparatus.

- Encouraged initiative at lower levels in policy implementation.

- Launched a "charm offensive" to spruce up the style and conduct of Soviet foreign policy, helping to improve the international image of the Soviet Union and ensure that Soviet positions get a better hearing.

Gorbachev's ability to manage Soviet foreign policy effectively will be critical not only to the success of his program for domestic revitalization but also to his personal political position. He has considerably more room to manage policy in foreign affairs than in domestic matters, where the interests of other Politburo members are more directly threatened by policy decisions. By seizing the initiative and moving aggressively to place his own personal stamp on foreign policy, in the long run Gorbachev will directly bear the consequences of the success or failure of these policies.

#### The Problem Gorbachev Inherited

Gorbachev inherited a foreign policy apparatus dating from the Cold War of the 1950s that was ill suited to the complex task of managing Moscow's current international challenges. Mikhail Suslov, a key senior party secretary overseeing foreign affairs until his death in 1982, in public and in private took a rigidly doctrinaire view of the world that gave primacy to advancing Communist influence abroad and relatively little priority to improving relations with the West. The only party body concerned with the capitalist

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### "New Thinking" and Soviet Third World Policy

General Secretary Gorbachev and other leading Soviet officials have repeatedly stressed the need for "new thinking" on a broad range of foreign policy issues, including relations with the Third World. Recent Soviet leadership statements and academic and political writings have provided some indication of the directions the Soviets are taking in developing their new thinking toward this area:

- **Regional Conflicts.** Gorbachev has called political settlement of regional conflicts "a dictate of our time," since these conflicts can "assume dangerous proportions" in the nuclear era. This theme has been a prominent element of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy on the conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Middle East, Nicaragua, and southern Africa.
- **East-West Functional Cooperation.** Soviet leaders and specialists have frequently said that a variety of Third World problems—including hunger, disease, and ecological challenges—should be tackled by cooperative East-West efforts.

- **The Limits to Armed Struggle.** Some Soviets now appear to be questioning the value of armed struggle as a vehicle of revolutionary change—and, presumably, as an instrument of foreign policy—in the contemporary world. At least one author, writing in Pravda, suggests that promoting armed struggle gains the USSR little by way of reliable allies or influence in the Third World.

Despite the rhetoric, there are few indications that this new thinking has led to substantive changes in Soviet policy. On regional conflicts, for example, an active Soviet public diplomacy on the need for settlements has not been matched by changes in the Kremlin's underlying positions. In addition, Soviet statements on East-West functional cooperation have not been followed by discussion of how this might be carried out. Nonetheless, these statements and writings indicate that Soviet policymakers are looking to their specialists for new concepts and ideas on the Third World, that no firm "party line" exists on many issues, and that some genuine changes in Moscow's Third World policies could emerge.

world was the International Department, under the leadership of Boris Ponomarev since 1957, which focused on promoting international Communism. The task of managing relations with the West was left largely to Andrey Gromyko's Foreign Ministry, which grew in influence during the 1970s with detente. The Soviet leadership apparently did not have a separate policymaking body charged with strategic planning and adapting Soviet foreign policy to changing world conditions

Up to the late 1960s the International Department had played a large role in foreign affairs, but its influence declined as Gromyko's increased. According to [ ] by the late 1970s the role of the MFA and the International Department had been essentially reversed, with the department concurring with policy positions already established by the ministry.

The influence of the International Department was undermined not only by the rise of Gromyko, but also by the rigidly doctrinaire approach taken by Ponomarev, its longtime head. Having risen through its ranks and headed the department since the mid-1950s, he was a relic of the past, whose public pronouncements made clear that he was incapable of advancing "new thinking." In many ways his inflexibility made the department more of an impediment than an asset to the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

[ ] official suggested that the removal of Ponomarev would serve as the litmus test of Soviet intentions of putting relations with European parties on a different footing

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### *Soviet Foreign Policy at a Dead End*

*The early 1980s presented the Soviet leadership with an unfavorable tide of events and shrinking payoffs from established policies:*

- *There was no end in sight to the war in Afghanistan, which was damaging the Soviet position in the Third World and becoming increasingly costly at home.*
- *In the Third World, Soviet activism of the Brezhnev era had produced a growing list of expensive client states—Cuba, Ethiopia, and Angola.*
- *US policy had moved in what Moscow perceived to be a more bellicose direction with Ronald Reagan's election as President and his promotion of SDI.*
- *The Soviet failure to halt INF deployment and the subsequent walkout from Geneva in November 1983 took Soviet policy toward the West down a dead end.*
- *East European allies, facing a difficult economic situation, were increasingly looking to the West for help*

Soviet foreign policy produced notable successes in the 1970s—such as the strategic arms agreements, gains in Africa, and the Helsinki Accord of 1975—but by the end of the decade Soviet foreign policy was becoming decreasingly effective. As Soviet behavior made clear, Moscow's foreign policy apparatus had become more concerned with perpetuating old policies and responding to crises. Soviet foreign policy in many areas became carved in stone, and there was little room for trying new approaches to old problems. The foreign policy establishment inherited by Gorbachev was leading the USSR further and further down a dead end.

Not only was the foreign policy approach of the Brezhnev era failing to produce favorable results, but it also was expensive. As Soviet domestic economic constraints began to increase in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union could less afford the costs of empire. Client states were becoming increasingly costly to maintain, as political gains were increasingly becoming economic liabilities. In addition, the cost of relying so heavily on military power to maintain influence abroad was becoming more burdensome.

### *The Dominance of Gromyko*

Having increasingly dominated Soviet foreign policy during almost three decades as Foreign Minister, Andrey Gromyko, by the time Gorbachev became party leader, had gathered most of the levers of Soviet foreign policy decisionmaking into his own hands. He especially dominated the critical area of East-West relations. Moreover, an entire generation of Soviet foreign policy experts had advanced under Gromyko, increasing his influence and ensuring that his approach to foreign policy and diplomacy would not be easily erased.

As Gromyko's prestige and influence grew, so did the role of the MFA in policy formulation and planning. A 1968 Central Committee decree detailed steps to improve the MFA's information collection and analytic capabilities and to increase its staffing. The high personnel turnover in the deputy minister ranks between 1965 and 1975 (75 percent) allowed Gromyko to put his own people in charge.

As his influence increased, Gromyko became more firmly identified with rigidity in Soviet foreign policy. Disappointment with détente during the early 1980s seems to have turned Gromyko into an increasingly rigid hardliner, with a hostile and embittered view of the Reagan administration. During this period, Gromyko's writings and public statements show a basic mistrust of the Reagan administration's motives and prescribe unyielding firmness in dealing with the West.

[ ] depicted Gromyko as the chief influence on Soviet policy toward the United States, and suggested that the United States attempt to circumvent the foreign minister and deal directly with Chernenko. A number of East European officials claimed that the harshness of the Soviet approach to East-West affairs was a direct consequence of Gromyko's influence, pointing to his role in vetoing the planned visit by East German leader Erich Honecker to West Germany in the summer of 1984.

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**Rigid Party Apparatus**

The party apparatus Gorbachev inherited was not prepared to challenge the advice he was receiving from Gromyko's MFA or to deal with the complex problems of the nuclear age. The activities of the staff of the Central Committee departments involved in foreign affairs and other reporting made it clear that they were focused largely on managing relations

with other Communist parties and overseeing Soviet activities abroad, and did not address relations with other parts of the world or overall strategic planning:

- The International Department focused primarily on relations with nonruling Communist parties, leftist parties, national liberation groups, and front groups. Individuals in the department, however, have played

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an active role on other policy fronts—for example, Vadim Zagladin on Western Europe and Ivan Kovalenko on Japan.

- The Department for Liaison With Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (Bloc relations) dealt exclusively with other ruling Communist parties.
- The mandate of the International Information Department, created in 1977, was limited to improving the presentation of Soviet foreign propaganda.
- The Cadres Abroad Department was concerned exclusively with the assignment of Soviet personnel overseas (particularly diplomats, correspondents, and trade officials, but not KGB or military)

#### Growing Concern

As Gromyko increased his hold over Soviet foreign policy in the early 1980s, Moscow's rigid approach to changing international realities appeared to be the cause of growing concern within the Soviet elite:

- In October 1984 a [ ] Soviet official described [ ] an increasing sense of disquiet and frustration over the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, saying the Politburo had "run out of ideas" and was resorting to ill-conceived stopgap measures.
- While Chernenko was General Secretary [ ] described a generation gap in the Politburo, saying that the older generation was being blamed for the downward spiral in East-West relations.
- In June 1984 a [ ] condemned the Chernenko leadership as inherently weak and unable to devote sufficient attention to the pressing issues of foreign affairs, a characterization repeated [ ]

As a result of these concerns, the Soviet foreign policy establishment became polarized between those who supported Gromyko's traditional approach and those who viewed his policies as a failure. Those taking the

traditional approach toward the West claimed in their public and private remarks that the West was entirely to blame for the decline of detente. Critics of that approach, such as Institute of the USA and Canada head Georgiy Arbatov and political commentator Aleksandr Boyin, described the decision to invade Afghanistan in late 1979 as a blunder and Gromyko's hardline approach to the INF negotiations as unproductive.

#### Gorbachev Takes Charge

After becoming party leader, Gorbachev moved decisively to put foreign policy decisionmaking on a different track. He removed Gromyko from the MFA in July 1985 and ended its monopoly on decision-making by expanding and refocusing the capabilities of the party Secretariat. These changes provided Gorbachev alternatives in making foreign policy decisions and helped infuse into the thinking of the party leadership the ideas of Soviet foreign policy specialists who, under Brezhnev, had been calling for new approaches.

#### Revamping the Secretariat

Gorbachev's overhaul of the party Secretariat has had a more fundamental impact on the process of foreign policy decisionmaking than his shakeup of the MFA. By expanding the Secretariat's competence and putting top experts on the West in key positions, Gorbachev created a counterweight to the MFA in the foreign policy decisionmaking process that can challenge its recommendations and provide an alternative source of analysis.

Because the Secretariat, in effect, serves as the personal staff of the General Secretary, it has considerable influence. In the post-Stalin period it has given the General Secretary a means to build political support, enhance his personal authority, and increase his influence over his colleagues on the Politburo. The Secretariat not only directs the work of the entire party machine on a day-to-day basis, but also has the duty of preparing policy proposals for submission to the Politburo.

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Declaring that the Soviet Union was at a major "turning point" in foreign policy, Gorbachev moved boldly at the 27th Party Congress to reshape the party's leadership in foreign affairs, adding three close allies to the Secretariat to oversee this sector:

- Anatoliy Dobrynin, who had been serving as Ambassador to the United States, replaced the old Comintern operative Boris Ponomarev, who served for 30 years as head of the International Department.
- Vadim Medvedev replaced Konstantin Rusakov as head of the Bloc Relations Department.
- Aleksandr Yakovlev, the former Ambassador to Canada who headed the Propaganda Department from July 1985 to August 1986, was elevated to the Secretariat—a status not enjoyed by his predecessors.

*The International Department.* The appointment of Dobrynin as head of the International Department in March 1986 began the shift of the center of gravity for foreign policy formulation from the MFA to the Secretariat. Gorbachev has transformed the International Department from an institution with a reputation as a rigid defender of Moscow's role as the leader of international Communism into the center for strategic planning of foreign policy. Reporting now indicates that he relies heavily on it for foreign policy advice, and in many ways it plays a role similar to that of the US National Security Council, serving as the nerve center of policy planning and decision-making. More than any other body in the foreign policy apparatus, it is charged with taking a comprehensive view of the international situation. With a well-established Americanist as its head and a new political-military section, it plays a central role in determining the political-security dimensions of East-West relations and puts the lie to early reports that Gorbachev was going to change the "America first" thrust of Soviet foreign policy.

Secretary Dobrynin has maintained a high public profile. He has participated in numerous negotiating sessions between Gorbachev and visiting foreign dignitaries, played a prominent role at the two US-Soviet

summits, and delivered major foreign policy speeches elaborating "new thinking." He has frequently met with foreign ambassadors, as well as visiting Communist officials, and used these occasions to make substantive foreign policy pronouncements. By contrast, Ponomarev, his predecessor, was not present at either the 1974 or 1979 US-Soviet summits and rarely conducted negotiations with ambassadors or foreign government officials.

In discussions with foreign leaders, Dobrynin has acted with extreme self-confidence—so much so that he appears on occasion to slight Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

To carry out the department's expanded mandate, Dobrynin has increased its staff, adding an additional first deputy and specialists to deal with new responsibilities. Vadim Zagladin, since 1975 the first deputy of the department under Ponomarev, has retained responsibility for the traditional functions of relations with nonruling Communist parties, leftist parties, national liberation groups, and front organizations, while apparently also dealing with the public opinion aspects of arms control. The new first deputy Georgiy Korniyenko, a specialist on US-Soviet relations, deals primarily with the department's new functions.

The creation of a new political-military sector headed by Maj. Gen. Viktor Starodubov for the first time gives the International Department expertise on defense issues. This new staff is probably designed to ensure that the party leadership is not a captive of the military point of view on arms control issues; it should facilitate contact between the party and military experts and promote better coordination of national

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security policy in general. Starodubov is a widely respected expert on the technical details of arms control, with many years of experience in this area.

Even in performing its traditional functions, the International Department is dealing with a broader range of foreign groups that could help advance Soviet interests. [ ] Zagladin said the department's previous function of dealing with other Communist parties has been expanded to take greater account of the role of social and nongovernmental groups in influencing foreign policy in the West. These changes have coincided with a greater emphasis on cooperation with West European Communist parties.

There are indications that in recent months Dobrynin's personal influence has diminished somewhat with the promotion of party secretary Yakovlev to full Politburo membership and the growing competence of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on foreign policy matters. [ ]

[ ] suggest that this is due in part to his shortcomings as a politician and manager, and to the fact that his long tenure in Washington left him without a strong power base in Moscow.

The limits on Dobrynin's influence have not resulted in a downgrading of the International Department. It is still reported to be the central coordinating body for Soviet foreign policy planning, but is apparently now under the indirect supervision of party secretary Yakovlev. Yakovlev's influence in the Gorbachev regime has steadily risen. He was promoted to party secretary in March 1986, to candidate member of the Politburo in January 1987, and to full member in June. With his elevation to the Politburo, he has reportedly assumed a broad portfolio that includes ideology, culture, and evidently general oversight for foreign policy. He consequently is probably now overseeing the work of the International Department and Dobrynin, who remains a junior party secretary without Politburo standing.

*The Propaganda Department.* Gorbachev has stepped up the use of propaganda, using it aggressively and effectively to advance Soviet interests abroad. Propaganda campaigns have been closely coordinated with diplomatic initiatives to manipulate public opinion abroad in support of Soviet foreign policy goals. Gorbachev's "charm offensive" and some of his domestic reforms—most notably on human rights questions—have played a key part in these efforts, which have helped improve the Soviet image abroad.

Yakovlev headed the Propaganda Department from 1985 until shortly after he became a party secretary. As department head, he focused on giving new dynamism and sophistication to Soviet public diplomacy. He gave up day-to-day management of the Propaganda Department in August 1986, and a former associate, Yuriy Sklyarov, was installed in his place.

In an apparent effort to promote a more consistent public treatment of Soviet foreign policy at home and abroad, the Secretariat departments overseeing these sectors were combined in early 1986. The International Information Department, created by Brezhnev in 1977, was abolished and its functions were largely taken over by the Propaganda Department. It is now a major section within the Propaganda Department, and it is reportedly headed by Nikolay Shishlin—a frequent commentator on international affairs who was among those pushing for new approaches under Brezhnev.

*Bloc Relations.* Gorbachev has moved with equal force to pave the way for policy innovations toward the Communist world. Konstantin Rusakov, head of the Bloc Relations Department since 1978, was replaced by Vadim Medvedev in early 1986; thus, another official indebted to Gorbachev was put in a key foreign policy position. Given his previous service as head of the Central Committee's Science and Educational Institutions Department, Medvedev's appointment appears to reflect Moscow's current emphasis on promoting intra-Bloc scientific and technical cooperation. Medvedev may owe his appointment, in part, to his past association with party secretary Yakovlev, with whom he served in the late 1970s as a deputy chief of the Propaganda Department.

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Medvedev has apparently had to move with caution to defuse the influence of hardliners over Bloc policy. When he took over the department he inherited as his first deputy Oleg Rakhmanin, an outspoken hardliner who took a rigid approach to diversity within the Bloc and accommodation with China. In the fall of 1986 he moved to undermine the power of Rakhmanin by appointing a second first deputy head of the department, Georgiy Shakhnazarov, who is an outspoken defender of diversity within the Bloc. Only months later was Medvedev able to remove Rakhmanin.

#### Cleaning Out the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The single most critical step taken by Gorbachev in gaining control of the foreign policy process was the transfer of Gromyko from the Foreign Ministry to the

Presidency in July 1985. At the time, Soviet officials widely interpreted the move as the first step in breaking the hold of the Gromyko "Mafia" on the MFA. Indeed, within the year Gorbachev succeeded in conducting a thorough housecleaning

It was easier to remove Gromyko than to erase his legacy of almost 30 years as head of the foreign policy apparatus. Almost every member of the foreign policy establishment, particularly at the top, owed his career to Gromyko and had learned to think and operate under his tutelage. Gorbachev needed to find and elevate qualified substantive experts who were capable of adapting to his more activist policy and taking new approaches to old problems

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minister—in sharp contrast to his predecessor—would strictly adhere to policy guidelines laid down by the General Secretary.

Shevardnadze's personal style also was in tune with the new leadership. [ ] Gorbachev viewed Shevardnadze as able to project Soviet policy with more flair than Gromyko. Shevardnadze's demonstrated sensitivity to public opinion while serving as party chief in Georgia and his skill in using the media probably were also key factors in his selection. In addition, Shevardnadze's reputation for cleaning up corruption in his native Georgia sent a message to the foreign policy establishment that Gorbachev intended to remove dishonest, ineffective, and superannuated Gromyko-era officials from the MFA and to impose new, more rigorous standards on holdovers.

Despite his lack of foreign policy experience, Shevardnadze is coming into his own as foreign minister. As he masters his substantive brief, he is reportedly showing more authority and self-confidence in meeting with foreigners.

Personnel shifts following Shevardnadze's appointment began slowly, but a key change foreshadowed a larger housecleaning. In December 1985, Valentin Nikiforov was moved from the Central Committee Cadres Department to take over as Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of personnel. [ ]

[ ] Nikiforov was tasked with preparing a draft reorganization of the ministry, including changes in the process by which ambassadorial assignments are made. One [ ] [ ] predicted that Nikiforov's move would lead to a major purge of senior ministry officials via forced retirements. This assessment was soon to prove correct.

*Reading the Riot Act.* In May 1986, at a highly unusual meeting of Foreign Ministry personnel, Gorbachev launched a full court press to rid the MFA of Gromyko's influence. The meeting was without precedent in recent decades: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko are not known to have addressed such a

To resolve this problem Gorbachev turned to a novice in the foreign policy arena who was not tainted by previous ties to Gromyko. In choosing Georgian party leader Eduard Shevardnadze and promoting him to full member of the Politburo, Gorbachev placed in this key position a political ally without an independent power base. Shevardnadze's lack of ties to ministry personnel made him an ideal choice to serve as a political hatchet man and ensured that he would conduct foreign policy in close accord with the General Secretary's wishes. Following his elevation, a number of MFA officials confirmed that the new foreign

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gathering. The significance that the leadership attributed to it was underscored by the attendance of all the members of Gorbachev's new foreign policy team: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the three new party secretaries with responsibility for foreign policy—Anatoliy Dobrynin, Vadim Medvedev, and Aleksandr Yakovlev. Gromyko was conspicuously absent.

Gorbachev sharply criticized the MFA's past performance. According to [ ] he complained not only about the work of Soviet diplomats abroad but also about the general foreign policy approach under Gromyko. In effect, Gorbachev reminded ministry personnel that Gromyko was no longer in charge and that they were now expected to embrace fully the policies and methods of the new regime.

Although Gorbachev did not attack Gromyko by name, the summary of his remarks carried by Soviet media indicated that he took an indirect swipe at Gromyko's stewardship—examining the "recent" experience of Soviet diplomacy "critically and with party-style exactingness" and outlining a series of "measures" ostensibly designed to implement the foreign policy prescriptions of the 27th CPSU Congress. The publication of Gorbachev's de facto criticism of Gromyko also signaled to the Soviet foreign policy bureaucracy the importance he attributed to their acceptance and to implementation of the regime's "new thinking" in foreign affairs.

Gorbachev impressed on the Soviet diplomatic establishment the need for better performance and for more objective reporting from abroad. According to [ ] the General Secretary complained he had been repeatedly misled by reporting from the ministry, indicating that it reported only positive reactions to Soviet initiatives. Gorbachev singled out for criticism the reporting on foreign reactions to Soviet arms control proposals.

Several Soviet officials have said [ ] that following Gorbachev's address the ministry ordered radical changes in the system of diplomatic reporting. Diplomats were enjoined to make a greater effort to gather information firsthand rather than to rely

heavily on the local press. Policy guidance from Moscow was greatly reduced to encourage greater initiative from missions overseas. To help institutionalize new performance standards, weeklong courses were reportedly scheduled to "train" Soviet diplomats. A number of Soviet officials suggested that the more senior members of the diplomatic corps would have trouble complying with the new performance criteria—providing grounds for their termination.

Assessing the results of the May 1986 conference a year later, Shevardnadze gave mixed reviews. Addressing a meeting of top MFA officials, he said the problem of the "stagnant" approach previously taken to key foreign policy issues had been "substantially rectified" and that the reorganization of the MFA was largely complete. At the same time, however, he described this as "only a modest beginning," stating that additional steps to improve the diplomatic service would be taken.

**Personnel Shakeup.** Gorbachev's critique of the Foreign Ministry was accompanied by a major overhaul of its leadership. [ ] Shevardnadze stated that by March 1987 all department chiefs in the ministry had been replaced. In the process, the ministerial leadership responsible for monitoring US-Soviet relations was totally overhauled. By the time the shakeup was complete, virtually the entire top management of the MFA had been replaced:

- On the eve of Gorbachev's address to the foreign policy apparatus, the two first deputy ministers were replaced by Yuliy Vorontsov and Anatoliy Kovalev.
- The deputy minister responsible for dealing with the United States—Viktor Komplektov—was given a new portfolio on Latin America and international economic relations and was replaced by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.
- In all, seven of the nine deputy ministers have been appointed under Gorbachev. The two holdovers are Komplektov, who was promoted under Andropov,

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and 81-year-old Leonid Il'ichev, who is [ ] working only three hours a day and whose responsibilities have been largely assumed by newly appointed Deputy Minister Igor Rogachev.

These changes have gone a long way in eroding Gromyko's influence. Despite the fact that virtually all the new appointees gained their experience under him, a number also have close ties to former Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin, who became head of the International Department in March 1986. This connection over time should diminish the "Gromyko factor" in Soviet foreign policy:

- New First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov has emphasized his close relationship with Dobrynin—telling [ ] that he and Dobrynin see eye to eye on most major policy issues.
- Deputy Minister for US-Soviet relations Aleksandr Bessmertnykh served in the Soviet Embassy in Washington for 13 years under Dobrynin (1970-1983) and is probably a protege. He plays a key role in coordinating Soviet policy toward the United States and has also assumed a relatively high public profile.

In the area of Sino-Soviet relations, a number of high-level personnel changes appear to have helped pave the way for a more flexible posture by Moscow. Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev, appointed in August 1986 as head of the MFA's new Administration for Socialist Countries of Asia (China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Indochina), is much more flexible than his predecessor. He replaces Mikhail Kapitsa, an acknowledged hardliner, who was moved to a sinecure as director of the Oriental Studies Institute. Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev has not yet been officially retired, but he has been removed from the China account and no longer plays an active role. Il'ichev and Kapitsa were both closely associated with Brezhnev's standpat policies toward China. In

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✓ May 1987, a [ ] directly linked this personnel shift to a more flexible Soviet approach toward China.

Although the initial housecleaning appears to be largely complete, Shevardnadze has indicated he will continue to purge the ministry of officials who are not up to the new standards. [ ]

[ ] 1987, he said that, under a new system of personnel review, the performance of all ministry personnel would be reviewed every two to three years by newly created commissions of top ministry officials that would determine whether individuals should be promoted, demoted, or fired.

**Organizational Changes.** Organizational changes introduced by Shevardnadze are a striking demonstration of the ministry's new approach to foreign policy. These changes are designed to break down traditional barriers, foster holistic thinking about the full range of foreign policy issues, and find new ways for getting around old problems. [ ]

[ ] First Deputy Foreign Minister Voronov stressed that the changes would result in a less rigid structure—with deputy ministers having more latitude, including the right to report and consult with senior officials in an effort to reduce policy bottlenecks.

To restructure the MFA, Shevardnadze created new administrations to treat as a strategic whole each of the discrete critical areas of Soviet policy—such as arms control and Eastern Europe—as well as to give prominence to press and propaganda needs.<sup>1</sup> The Soviet Foreign Ministry detailed the changes in a June 1986 note to the Moscow diplomatic community. Although much of the ministry's basic structure has been left intact, the reorganization streamlines the way it handles relations with major regions of the

<sup>1</sup> Before the current reorganization, the term "administration" was used to apply to large, nonpolicy entities. The new administrations appear to outrank departments (*otdel*), are policy oriented, and in some cases are headed by deputy foreign ministers.

world and enhances its ability to handle functional issues that cut across state and regional boundaries. Among the significant changes are the following:

- **Arms Control Administration.** Given the high priority the Gorbachev regime has placed on arms control, the creation of a new Administration for Questions of Arms Limitation and Disarmament appears to be the most important change. Viktor Karpov, until recently the head of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks, heads the administration. It also had primary responsibility for the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) that was concluded in September 1986, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), and unspecified policy aspects of the nuclear testing issue. In November 1986 [ ] [ ] indicated that it was still having some trouble recruiting "indians."

- **International Organizations Administration.** This former department has been upgraded to an administration that handles Soviet diplomacy at various international organizations. Reflecting Gorbachev's considerable interest in nuclear energy and space issues, the Questions of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and Space Department has been created. [ ] the administration continues to have some responsibility for arms control issues—including arms issues at the United Nations.

- **Human Rights Administration.** In recognition of the continuing importance of human rights issues in Soviet relations with the West, the former Cultural Relations Department has been subsumed into the new Administration for Humanitarian and Cultural Ties, headed by Yuriy Kolosov, the chief Soviet delegate to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The administration is reportedly modeled after the US Department of State's Bureau of Human Rights. It has served as

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the main conduit for addressing foreign complaints of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and has done an effective job of projecting a more responsive, concerned Soviet attitude.

- *Information Administration.* To improve the presentation of Soviet views to foreign audiences, a new MFA Information Administration was created from the former Press Department. It is headed by English-speaking Gennadiy Gerasimov, a veteran Soviet foreign correspondent. He has expanded the use of Foreign Ministry press conferences, as well as frequent press briefings by prominent officials, mostly on arms control issues.
- *Administration for Socialist Countries of Europe.* This new administration has responsibility for the East European countries that were previously handled in several European departments. For example, East Germany is no longer treated together with West Germany (as part of the Third European Department) but as a Bloc country.
- *Administration for Socialist Countries of Asia.* As in the case of Eastern Europe, Asian Communist countries previously handled by a number of departments are now under this new administration, headed by Deputy Minister Rogachev. The new section for Asian Communist countries now treats China as a member of the Communist community.
- *Near East and North Africa Administration.* This section combines the two old departments that dealt with Arab countries.
- *Administration for International Economic Relations.* The creation of this section reflects the high Soviet priority given to this area.

#### Other Key Players

In addition to the MFA and the Secretariat, there are other key institutes that have input into foreign policy decisionmaking. The heads of some of these, like the military or the KGB, ordinarily serve on the Politburo, giving them particular influence. Others, like the foreign policy institutes or Gorbachev's personal staff,

have access at the highest levels, but their influence depends largely on their ability to present a compelling case and has no independent political base.

#### Gorbachev's Personal Staff

Gorbachev's foreign policy advisers on his personal staff provide him with policy and administrative support. Their duties apparently include handling scheduling arrangements, drafting speeches, coordinating and screening material from the Central Committee departments, and accompanying the General Secretary to meetings. Although they have no independent power, their direct access to Gorbachev and their control over much of the material that crosses his desk make his advisers key players in the foreign policy decisionmaking process.

Gorbachev has two foreign policy advisers as well as a domestic adviser with expertise in foreign policy matters:

- Anatoliy Chernyayev is Gorbachev's top foreign policy aide. In February 1986 he replaced Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov, who was a foreign policy aide to successive general secretaries for 20 years. Chernyayev had been a top official with the International Department for many years, and he did not state or publish his views during this period. However, there have been a few indications that he has a pragmatic orientation that plays down ideology, and several [ ] have characterized him as a "liberal."
- Viktor Sharapov focuses on Soviet relations with other Communist countries. He was also an adviser to Andropov and Chernenko.
- Ivan Frolov became an aide to Gorbachev on domestic policy in May 1987. An expert on domestic affairs, Frolov has also written extensively on foreign affairs, frequently collaborating with First Deputy Chief of the International Department Zagladin, emphasizing the importance of interdependence and the need for arms reductions.

Gorbachev reportedly solicits the advice of prominent Soviet civilian scientists on defense and arms control affairs. Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the

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Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Roald Sagdeyev, head of the Academy's Space Research Institute, appear to be principal among Gorbachev's informal advisers on security issues. [ ]

#### The KGB

The influence of the KGB on key foreign policy decisions is exercised mainly through its chairman who, with brief exceptions, has been a full member of the Politburo since 1973 and is also presumably a member of the Defense Council. KGB influence in foreign policy debates usually takes the form of assessments that suggest a particular line of action rather than direct policy recommendations. Since it has a monopoly of information gathered from its vast networks abroad, it probably can often bring evidence to bear that is unknown to other participants.

The KGB's role in the foreign policy arena has reportedly increased in recent years. Since the later years of the Brezhnev era, the First (Foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate has expanded from 8,000 to almost 15,000 employees, a third of whom are posted abroad. According to [ ] Gorbachev praised the KGB for its objective briefings during his visit to London in 1985, saying that, while the MFA briefings were usually useless, he got "real ideas" from the KGB.

The KGB has also expanded its role in the field of intelligence analysis. According to [ ] the Directorate of Intelligence Information of the First Chief Directorate has been expanded from fewer than 70 persons in the mid-1970s to approximately 300. The Directorate [ ] prepares classified papers for the Politburo and the Secretariat on the basis of reports sent to Moscow from KGB residencies abroad.

#### The Ministry of Defense

While the Soviet military continues to be a major factor in foreign policy decisionmaking, particularly on questions that directly affect security issues, its influence has been reduced by Gorbachev. He has altered the national security decisionmaking process to provide greater civilian involvement. The Soviet military continues to have a strong influence on arms control, but its recommendations no longer go largely unchallenged. According to [ ] Gorbachev felt that the military lacked the flexibility needed on arms control and US-Soviet relations, so he brought in more civilian advisers to shape his national security policy.

Before Gorbachev, the General Staff's recommendations on arms control issues frequently went unchallenged. The crucial information on Soviet and foreign weapon systems resided in the military and in its intelligence arm, the GRU, giving them a major advantage. Gorbachev's expansion of the International Department—particularly the creation of a new sector dealing with arms control under Lt. Gen. Viktor Starodubov—has given it the capability to become involved in the technical aspects of arms control. While this move challenges the military's past predominance in framing arms control policies, the General Staff will continue to play a major role in supporting the leadership, given the depth of its expertise and its near monopoly of information, particularly on the USSR's own systems.

The Defense Council appears to be the key body where military considerations are factored into decisions on foreign policy issues such as arms control. In effect the Defense Council is a subcommittee of the Politburo for national security affairs. Although its exact composition is unclear, it includes the members of the Politburo responsible for national security issues and is supported by the General Staff. The role of the Defense Council in making major arms control [ ]

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decisions was underscored by Gorbachev in February 1987 when he invoked his title as its head in announcing the Soviet decision to delink INF and SDI in February 1987.

#### The Institutes

The foreign policy research institutes of the Academy of Sciences have steadily increased their influence since the early 1970s and appear to play an active role under Gorbachev. In 1985, for example, Georgiy Arbatov, head of the Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC), that his institute and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) were being encouraged by Gorbachev to increase their analysis of the United States and "beef up" their staffs.

There are seven major institutes under the Soviet Academy of Sciences that play an advisory role in the formulation of foreign policy and that are tasked with predicting long-term trends in foreign countries:

- The Institute of World Economy and International Relations, directed by Yevgeniy Primakov, was the first institute created to study international issues after Stalin's death. It focuses on global economic problems, and it also has sections dealing with the US economy and disarmament. Primakov's star has been on the rise since Gorbachev came to power. He was made a candidate member of the Central Committee in March 1986. He accompanied the General Secretary to Reykjavik and New Delhi, and he sat next to him during his November 1986 interview with Indian journalists. Primakov is interested in pragmatic approaches to foreign policy issues and is known as an optimist about obtaining US acceptance of a Soviet role in negotiating the Arab-Israeli dispute. IMEMO reportedly employs over 750 people, about half of whom are full-time researchers. Currently it is about twice the size of the other institutes.
- The Institute of the USA and Canada, directed by Georgiy Arbatov, was created in 1967. Arbatov claims to advise Gorbachev regularly, and as a member of the Central Committee participates in high-level debates.

the MFA had initially been chosen to draft Gorbachev's response for his 1985 *Time* interview. When the draft proved unsatisfactory, Georgiy Arbatov and IUSAC staffers were called on, and Arbatov was the only official who sat in on the interview.

- The Institute of Latin America, directed by Viktor Vol'skiy, was set up after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and has sections dealing with the political, economic, and demographic problems of Latin America.
- The Institute of Africa is directed by Anatoliy Gromyko, the son of President Gromyko, and was created at the end of the 1950s to study the newly emerging African nations.
- The Institute of Oriental Studies is directed by former Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa. It focuses on the Middle East and the Arab world, but it also has a number of China specialists who have favored improved relations with China. These moderates believe that their approach has received the backing of the General Secretary and point to Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech as a signal of their ascendancy. The members of the moderate camp seem confident that a more pragmatic policy toward Asia as a whole and China in particular is gaining the upper hand over the more ideological traditional approach.
- The Institute of the Far East has been directed by Mikhail Titarenko since July 1985. It has been a haven for advocates of a hardline approach to relations with China.
- The Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, directed by Oleg Bogomolov, focuses on other Communist countries and CEMA, and has been a leading center of reform thinking on foreign policy and Soviet domestic affairs. Bogomolov has pushed for closer economic integration of CEMA.

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The major institute foreign policy specialists are well positioned to increase their role under Gorbachev because many aspects of "new thinking" draw heavily on their work. For example, Gorbachev's approach to arms control drew on the views of specialists at IUSAC and IMEMO, such as Oleg Bykov and Genrikh Trofimenko, who had argued since the early 1970s that neither superpower could achieve strategic superiority, and that the security of the superpowers was based on political accommodation rather than military force. Gorbachev's emphasis on influencing Western opinion drew on the public opinion research that had been initiated and developed at IMEMO and IUSAC during the 1970s.

#### Costs of Reorganization

Gorbachev and Dobrynin have publicly hinted about internal resistance in implementing their foreign policy program. In a January 1986 speech Gorbachev intimated that "negative" attitudes about the need for change might be present among Soviet officials: A "certain inertia of thinking," he said, "can block realization that the world is rapidly changing before our very eyes," and many traditional views that were "possibly correct" in the past are now "hopelessly outdated." Dobrynin hinted in even stronger language at the possibility of internal resistance in a May 1986 speech, saying that the process of "shaping and affirming the new thinking" is a "difficult matter," and "fierce clashes, sharp discussions, and painful differences are inevitable" in this process.

Gorbachev's moves to create competing centers of analysis appear to have heightened institutional rivalries. In September 1986 [ ]

[ ] in the [ ] asserted that the MFA had lost influence and claimed that his department, not IUSAC, is Gorbachev's most important source of policy advice. [ ]

[ ] of the international [ ] implicitly criticized the MFA's support for the Paris summit and implied that his department could have done a better job.

There have been persistent reports of rivalry within the Secretariat between Yakovlev and Dobrynin. While these reports appear to be based in part on their

different approaches to Soviet-US relations, there also is probably bureaucratic competition for influence between these two former ambassadors to North America. With his elevation to full member of the Politburo in June 1987, Yakovlev clearly emerged as the more influential of the two and may now be supervising Dobrynin.

In November 1986 [ ]

[ ] described the Soviet foreign policy community as split into two factions, with Dobrynin heading one and Yakovlev, with the support of Arbatov, heading the other. [ ] maintained that the clash is based largely on a struggle for power and influence rather than on specific policy disputes. [ ] could indicate that this is a conflict between two career networks, one centered on the Foreign Ministry and led by Dobrynin, and the other based on the propaganda apparatus and the Academy of Sciences institutes led by Yakovlev.

Gorbachev's encouragement of competition also appears to have increased dissatisfaction of members of the foreign policy bureaucracy who feel they cannot adapt to the new rules and that their advice is being ignored. A number of [ ] have stressed the growing uncertainty and declining morale at the MFA. [ ] described much of the ministry as reacting like "confused sheep" to the sudden call from Moscow for quality performance.

[ ] indicated that a great many middle-level officials at the ministry feel threatened by the shakeup and are unable to cope with the new demands being placed on them. [ ] acknowledged that the system has trained them to be "dull-gray" bureaucrats, conditioned to obey and not to ask questions. Even at the International Department, the ostensible winner in Gorbachev's restructuring, veteran department officials are said to lament its "Americanization" and the downgrading of its traditional focus.

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The execution of Soviet foreign policy may also suffer in a situation where overlapping responsibilities can result in mixed signals or allow things to fall through the cracks.

[ ] accused Soviet diplomats at the MBFR talks of looking at Moscow's "new" proposals with "old eyes," claiming they have "created more problems than they have solved." He rated their efficiency in supporting Soviet positions "in the minus figures."

#### Domestic Constraints on Gorbachev

Despite the steps he has taken to enhance his control of foreign policy decisionmaking, Gorbachev does not have a free hand in shaping Soviet foreign policy. Major decisions in this area are made in the Politburo, and there have been persistent reports from Soviet sources of skepticism among some Politburo members and elements of the military over Gorbachev's approach. While reports of political infighting may in part be orchestrated to influence thinking abroad, the bulk of the evidence suggests that elements of Gorbachev's foreign policy are contentious. Some of those differences have been reflected in the public statements of some Politburo members and military leaders.

The January 1987 Central Committee plenum materials made clear that Gorbachev's security policies are still meeting resistance. In his speech, Gorbachev discussed defense in mild terms and spoke of improving it primarily by improving personnel and training. While the plenum resolution toned down Gorbachev's remarks on other issues, it used a much sharper formulation on this question, calling for a "comprehensive strengthening of defenses."

#### Gromyko's Role

As long as he remains on the Politburo, President Gromyko will continue to influence Soviet foreign policy because of his vast experience and personal

prestige. [ ] following Gorbachev's initial meeting with President Reagan and again in the assessment offered by Soviet officials following Reykjavik, Gromyko has been depicted as critical of Gorbachev's approach to dealing with the United States. In November 1985, [ ]

[ ] reportedly told Warsaw Pact colleagues that the Politburo "old guard" were grouping themselves around Gromyko, who was critical of the meeting. In late October 1986, a Soviet official indicated that both the military and Gromyko were displeased with the lack of progress in Iceland—especially because Gorbachev offered concessions that went beyond what the military had advised.

Nevertheless, in his public role, Gromyko has moved to the foreign policy sidelines since his appointment to the Presidency. Although he has been active performing diplomatic functions in Moscow, he has made no major foreign policy pronouncements, and he has not carried out important substantive negotiations with foreign visitors.

Exposures of corruption at the MFA's Diplomatic Academy during Gromyko's tenure may further undermine his position. [ ] Moscow party boss Boris Yel'tsin attacked "crude violations" at the Diplomatic Academy, complaining that 70 percent of its students are children of the elite and [ ] of its staff are related to each other. [ ] "Second" Secretary Ligachev criticized "serious problems" and nepotism at the academy and the MFA's Institute of International Relations. [ ]

[ ] reportedly [ ] that the academy had been the subject of a scandal and that, in what amounted to a personal defeat for Gromyko, Yel'tsin had fired all of its staff.

#### Politburo Differences

There have been indications that others in the Politburo have been skeptical of some of Gorbachev's foreign policy moves, limiting how far he can go in translating "new thinking" into new policies. The area

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of East-West relations, particularly the summit conferences at Geneva and Reykjavik, provides the clearest examples of some of the difficulties he may be encountering from his Politburo colleagues:

- Gorbachev's speech to the November 1985 Supreme Soviet after his meeting with President Reagan seemed defensive. Gorbachev stressed the importance of continued dialogue and agreements on the noninevitability of nuclear war, and pledged to meet again despite the absence of an agreement to stop SDI.
- Premier Ryzhkov—apparently a Gorbachev ally on this issue—~~criticized~~ those who "belittled" the results of the Geneva meeting.
- The wording of the Politburo endorsement after the Reykjavik summit was weaker than the one on Geneva, dropping the claim that it "fully endorsed" Gorbachev's performance and mentioning only that it "endorsed" his conduct.
- While not specifically naming any Politburo opponents, ~~he~~ told Westerners on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting and immediately after that there was a growing demand within the Politburo for a tougher line toward the United States because the leadership believed that Washington was interpreting signs of flexibility as indications of weakness.

In addition to Gromyko, Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, a Brezhnev-era holdover, appears to differ with the General Secretary on the United States. He has a long track record as one of the most pessimistic members of the leadership over the prospects for improved relations with the United States and has been an outspoken advocate of the need for strengthening defense. At the Supreme Soviet session following the Geneva meeting, he charged the United States with striving to achieve military superiority. At a Ukrainian party conference the next month, he spoke disparagingly about the results of Geneva, describing it as "providing no grounds for excessive illusions."

There have been a number of indications that Gorbachev and "Second" Secretary Yegor Ligachev do not see eye to eye on some foreign policy matters. Ligachev has publicly commented on the danger of increased contact with the West and has been more outspoken than other Politburo members on the need to strengthen Soviet defense.

Apparently Ligachev took a harder line than Gorbachev after the Reykjavik summit. In a speech at the Academy of Sciences published in *Pravda* in October 1986, Ligachev said that the summit had "proved with complete clarity" that the "Washington Administration does not desire genuine accords" and is "seeking to achieve military superiority over the USSR." He called for an increased defense effort. ~~That~~ Gorbachev and Ligachev ~~summit~~ and that, upon his return to Moscow, Ligachev told him he was naive to have expected results. In his November 1986 Revolution Day speech, Ligachev delivered a pessimistic assessment of US intentions and prospects for major arms agreements. He charged that the United States had demonstrated at Reykjavik not just an inability to meet the Soviet Union halfway but an "inability to make any movement at all"—an interpretation at odds with Gorbachev's continued public commitment to a dialogue with the Reagan administration.

Despite the skepticism of his Politburo colleagues, Gorbachev appears to have more latitude in setting foreign policy than domestic. Although other members of the Politburo are concerned about foreign policy, this area has traditionally been the prerogative of the General Secretary. Moreover, given the heated discussions that appear to be taking place over domestic matters, most Politburo members would appear to be more willing to use their political capital to protect their interests in matters that more directly affect their political turf. At the same time, however, they are laying down markers of their skepticism of some of the foreign policy lines being set out by Gorbachev, and if his initiatives do not produce the desired results they could eventually be used against him.

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#### Military Unease

There are also signs of unease within elements of the military over Gorbachev's approach to dealing with the West. Many of these concerns appear to coincide with those of Politburo members who are skeptical of Gorbachev's policies. Gorbachev appears to have the support of the top military leadership for now, but, if political opposition in the Politburo becomes more serious, the concerns within the military could become a more important factor.

In a number of initiatives, Gorbachev appears to have gone against positions favored by the military or that adversely affected its interest:

- In October 1986, a [ ] official indicated that the Soviet military was concerned about the extent of the concessions offered at Iceland and speculated that, to pursue his domestic reforms, Gorbachev would have to adopt a tougher line with the United States.
- About the same time, a [ ] noted the military's unhappiness with the repeated extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. While denying a military-political rift on this issue, Gorbachev [ ] have publicly indicated that the military was not enthusiastic about the moratorium.
- According to [ ] official, military objections had delayed Gorbachev's statement on the withdrawal of some troops from Mongolia as a step toward improving relations with the Chinese.

Gorbachev's efforts to hold down the growth of defense spending to help revive the economy may also be causing certain elements of the military some disquiet. There is no direct evidence to suggest that Gorbachev has sought to cut the military's budget, but he has reportedly told military leaders they will have to be more efficient and provide for defense needs without major new inputs. He has also demanded that the defense industry do more to support the civilian sector. Gorbachev's statements on military strength have generally been low-key and defensive in tone—contributing to the impression that his relations

with the military are cool. Nevertheless, some within the defense establishment appear to accept the notion that future military power demands major improvements in economic performance and find Gorbachev's concern for introducing advanced technologies as part of a modernization drive well placed.

#### Implications for the United States

Gorbachev's shakeup of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus has resulted in a sharp break with the decisionmaking process and conduct of diplomacy of the Gromyko era. The changes he has introduced have created a foreign policy apparatus that is much better prepared to deal with the realities of the 1980s and is capable of giving the Soviet leadership a much wider range of policy options. They have already produced a dizzying array of new initiatives, including arms control and related proposals—the nuclear testing moratorium and its monitoring by Westerners—and movement on China, including the withdrawal of a Soviet division from Mongolia. As a result of these changes, many of the assumptions that were used in dealing with the Soviet Union in the past are no longer valid, and the West must be prepared for the unprecedented or unexpected.

An immediate effect of Gorbachev's housecleaning of the foreign policy establishment has been a reevaluation of the policies of the Gromyko era and of the assumptions on which they were based. By removing many of the key officials responsible for past policies, the decisionmakers no longer have a personal stake in perpetuating the old line. Combined with the alternative centers for policy analysis Gorbachev has set up, this has produced new flexibility in Soviet policy. While overall objectives do not appear to have changed, there is a new willingness to try a variety of tactics to achieve them. The ability to take a more flexible line has been enhanced by a less rigid and more pragmatic approach to the world.

Gorbachev's moves have also promoted a more intimate connection between domestic and foreign policy. By shifting the center of foreign policy planning to the

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Secretariat—also the center for the strategic planning of domestic policy—both aspects can be better integrated. The integration of foreign and domestic concerns was evident in ending the division between foreign and domestic propaganda and placing both under Yakovlev in one department. With his background as an innovative regional politician, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is particularly well prepared to address the domestic implications of foreign policy decisions.

This closer interconnection between domestic and foreign policy concerns has been reflected in policy decisions. Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives are derived more directly from his domestic goals than was the case under Brezhnev, when expanding Soviet influence abroad appeared to be a top-priority objective in itself. Gorbachev's efforts to hold down defense spending in order to help his modernization drive helps to explain the high priority he has given to arms control. While internal considerations were probably the driving force in such steps as the release of Andrey Sakharov and other dissidents and in allowing an increase in Jewish emigration, the Gorbachev regime was aware of the foreign policy dividends they yield and sought to maximize that benefit. Similarly, Gorbachev's policy of openness and the "democratization" campaign he unveiled at the January 1987 plenum are being used by the Soviet Union to improve its image abroad.

Soviet policymakers clearly consider the foreign policy benefits of such domestic initiatives. A senior [ ] official recently indicated that many in the USSR had been surprised that the open airing of problems through *glasnost* had actually produced a "much more nuanced and favorable picture" of the Soviet Union abroad. Reporting on the January plenum, where *glasnost* evidently came in for some serious criticism, indicated that Georgiy Arbatov and other foreign policy officials defended the policy by pointing to the favorable impact it had had on the Soviet image abroad.

Gorbachev has already achieved some notable successes improving the image of the Soviet Union abroad:

- Although European opinion is certainly not unanimous, Gorbachev has made significant progress

improving the Soviet image in Europe. Prime Minister Thatcher's very favorable comments on his internal reforms are particularly noteworthy [ ] show the West Germans are altering their traditionally negative view of the Soviet system and are concluding that Gorbachev's policies portend fundamentally important shifts.

- Gorbachev's impact in China may be just as profound. Beijing has not yet been impressed with Gorbachev's steps in the bilateral relationship, but Chinese officials have been commenting more favorably on his domestic reforms.

While Gorbachev has yet to achieve a major foreign policy breakthrough, his success in reshaping the view of the Soviet Union abroad helps ensure that the Soviet position will get a more favorable hearing. So far Gorbachev's efforts have had a greater impact at lower levels than among policymakers, but the Soviets are obviously hoping that they can create pressure from below on Western politicians to take a more accommodating approach toward the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's efforts to manipulate Western public opinion present the United States with a greater challenge than the Soviet approach of the Brezhnev era. In the past, a combination of Soviet inflexibility and miscalculation undermined Moscow's credibility abroad, but Western leaders can no longer rely on the Soviets to make Western positions look relatively good.

While the greatest movement in Soviet policies so far has been toward the West and China, the changes that have taken place in other parts of the apparatus suggest that the leadership will be looking at new options for dealing with other areas of the world.

Gorbachev's ability to dramatically shift the Soviet position on key foreign policy issues is perhaps the best evidence that for now he has Politburo support for his initiatives. By taking such wide latitude in

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#### *A New Emphasis: Soviet West European Policy Under Gorbachev*

Soviet policy toward Western Europe is a good illustration of how the Gorbachev regime is effectively combining "new thinking" and a more effective propaganda offensive. Gorbachev has emphasized the subcontinent's position in East-West affairs and the inherent value of increased Soviet-West European ties. He has played the tune of a common European home and directed widespread contacts between Soviet Government and media officials and the West Europeans.

Gorbachev is using Western Europe as the major outside lever on the US-Soviet relationship. He is following a two-pronged approach: on arms control he casts Soviet initiatives in terms appealing to Europeans, and in bilateral activities he plays on a "Europe—our home" theme. We judge that he hopes both will induce West European leaders to exert pressure on Washington to be more flexible on East-West issues, especially arms control.

Gorbachev's new foreign policy team has crafted a favorable public image of the General Secretary in Western Europe and has introduced a vitality and flexibility to foreign policy decisionmaking unseen for decades. It produced the successful 1985 Geneva summit, orchestrated the "charm" offensive in the summer of 1986 in Western Europe, and developed the "double-zero" option on INF as a weapon against the US nuclear presence in Europe. Soviet foreign policy makers have also learned to turn their mistakes into advantages. After the dismal failure of tying an INF agreement to limitations on SDI, they

unlinked the two issues and launched a generally successful campaign in Western Europe portraying this change as a "concession." [ ] the Soviets believe they are ahead of the United States in the propaganda war and have an agenda that will be a winner in Western Europe.

Gorbachev's advisers are capable of subtle moves: Yakovlev reportedly said in late 1985 that Moscow would occasionally plant rumors that some type of German reunification was possible in order to soften West German public opinion on other issues. This tactic may have been used this spring when rumors of an impending Soviet initiative on reunification made headlines in the West German press.

Moscow is also actively pursuing increased trade with Western Europe and has lobbied heavily for joint economic ventures and broad cooperation in science and technology. The Soviets see Western Europe as their principal nondomestic source of modern technology and hope imports will make an important contribution to Gorbachev's revitalization of the Soviet economy. West Germany appears to be the most appealing to Moscow for increased trade, but the Soviets have been very diligent in wooing the British, French, and Italians. The USSR has also reorganized its foreign trade structure, an action that could lead to more effective trade with West European firms.

foreign policy matters, however, the success or failure of these policies is much more the General Secretary's personal responsibility than were the more collective policies of Brezhnev. Gorbachev has pursued new initiatives on a number of fronts, but a major foreign policy success continues to elude him. A breakthrough on a key issue—arms control, China, or Afghanistan—would help him domestically, but unless there

is a major foreign policy setback his lack of success is not critical to his political position at home. If Gorbachev runs into serious problems on domestic issues, however, his inability to show substantive results from his shakeup of the foreign policy apparatus would add to his troubles.

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